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In their pathbreaking discussions of the human family tree in the 1860s and 
1870s, Ernst Haeckel and Charles Darwin had to account for both the ascent of 
the species and its diversification into races. But what were the cause and the 
pattern of diversification, and when did it begin? Did we attain a common 
humanity first, which all the races still share? Or did we split up as apes and have 
to find our own separate and perhaps not equivalent ways to become human? 
Using texts and images from their principal works, this essay recovers 
Haeckel’s and Darwin’s views on these points, relates them to the monogenist-
polygenist debate, and compares them to Alfred Russel Wallace’s 1864 attempt at 
a compromise. 
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history of biology, especially evolution and heredity, and the sciences in modern 
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Introduction 
When we speak of “defining and redefining the borders between the human and 
the animal,” how do we picture those borders? Is there a sharp line across a 
single pathway or scale of nature? Is there a broad, blurred region? Or are we 
talking about an evolutionary tree rising toward the human level? Where is the 
boundary in that case? Does it cut across just one branch? Or are there several 
that might have made the grade, or might yet make it? 
Then, even if we can agree on the general arrangement of species, what 
should we make of any varieties or races within species, especially those near 
the border? Do the races occupy different levels on a scale, with some more 
human than others? Or can they stand side by side on different branches of a 
tree? And if the latter, where are the branching points in relation to the animal-
human border? In other words, did our ancestors first reach the human level all 
together, establish a common humanity, and only then diversify into races, 
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relatively recently and superficially? Or did the races diverge first, retaining deep 
and ancient differences as they ascended on separate pathways toward 
humanity? 
Even today, reconstructions of the human family tree are scrutinized for 
what they might imply about the unity of the species and the antiquity of racial 
differences. When studies of mitochondrial DNA in the late 1980s pointed to a 
relatively recent “mitochondrial Eve” who lived in Africa, the idea was appealing, 
at least in part, because it minimized racial divergence. Inspired by the 
mitochondrial data, the “Out-of-Africa Hypothesis,” quickly gained support. It had 
modern Homo sapiens originate exclusively on that continent, disperse 
throughout the world, replace H. erectus and its offshoots everywhere, and only 
then diversify into geographic races (Cann, Stoneking, and Wilson 1987). 
The main alternative, in the 1990s, was the “Multiregional Hypothesis,” 
under which proto-humans ranged over several continents while they were 
evolving into H. sapiens. Continual movement between regions created enough 
gene flow to ensure that the most important human characteristics would be 
shared world wide, but not too much to obliterate all racial differences, some of 
which might date back to H. erectus. Various compromise models are currently 
under discussion, which incorporate emigration of incipient H. sapiens out of 
Africa, but have them interbreeding at various rates with archaic regional forms, 
instead of replacing them. 
Despite the gene flow, proponents of a multiregional origin have found 
themselves on the defensive against charges that they undermine the unity of 
“modern humanness” (Wolpoff and Caspari 1997; Wolpoff, Hawks, and Caspari 
2000, esp. 129n.), and against insinuations that they give new life to nineteenth-
century theories of separate origins for the races or linear ascent of mankind 
(Gould 2002, 910–914; Wolpoff and Caspari 2002).  
One fear is that any linear picture of ascent, development, or classification 
would have social and ethical implications, like the old scale of nature or “great 
chain of being.” Eighteenth-century and Lamarckian versions of the scale were 
based not only on morphological complexity, but on mental progress. Higher 
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levels added sense organs and faculties not available at lower. Earlier versions 
had extended the scale upward to the angels and the godhead (Lovejoy 1936; 
Uschmann 1939). Hence, any attempts to arrange the human races on a scale, 
even if ostensibly based on physical criteria, carry connotations about degrees of 
humanness and moral advancement. 
Stephen J. Gould argued most forcefully in Ontogeny and Phylogeny 
(1977, 115–166) that linear systems encouraged simplistic comparisons and 
rankings of individuals and groups, and that they thereby lent scientific credibility 
to the worst forms of biologically based discrimination, including eugenics and 
National Socialism. 
The other fear is of polygenist anthropology, which argued that the human 
races were unrelated, separate productions or creations. The argument 
sometimes was used to justify slavery and imperialism under the assumption that 
separately created peoples did not all have the same moral standing or natural 
rights. The polygenists were engaged in a politically and ethically charged rivalry 
with the monogenists, who held that the races were all descended from common 
human stock. There were Biblical and biological arguments in favor of both 
positions.1  
The biological versions drew on pre-Darwinian successional 
paleontologies like those of Heinrich Georg Bronn in Germany or Charles Lyell in 
England. The idea was to take the discontinuities in the fossil record at face 
value. If a species seemed to appear suddenly at a particular time and place, it 
was presumed actually to have begun its existence then and there. How it 
originated was not explained, but it was presumed not to be by transformation of 
previous forms of life. The new species were unrelated to the old, no matter how 
similar they might look. 
Successional accounts were still influential right up until the publication of 
The Origin of Species in 1859 (Gliboff 2008; Rupke 2005), and Charles Darwin 
(1809–1881) treated them as his principal rivals. Whenever he spoke of 
“creation,” he was more likely to mean the paleontologist’s notion of species 
succession than the Biblical version. 
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Darwinian common descent quickly superseded the successional account 
in paleontology, but what were its implications for mongenist-polygenist debate in 
anthropology? Early Darwinians, including Darwin himself, his co-discoverer of 
natural selection, Alfred Russel Wallace (1823–1913), and his leading German 
interpreter, Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919) all addressed the problem in the 1860s 
and 1870s. 
Committed as they were to universal common descent, they all had to 
favor monogenism, but not necessarily a very recent common ancestor of all the 
races. If they made that ancestor distant enough and emphasized how far apart 
the races had grown, they could offer a compromise to the polygenists and 
perhaps win them over to the Darwinian camp.2
These authors have been much discussed in the secondary literature, yet 
there are great differences of opinion about what their views on race even were, 
and it is difficult to pin them down on the twin problems of ascent and 
divergence—in particular on the shape of the human family tree, where the races 
branched off, and at what point they became human. Haeckel and Darwin can 
seem at times to forget about the branching altogether and to speak of scales of 
human progress. Yet at other times they emphasize the diversity of the human 
family tree and that evolutionary change is not always upward on a scale. 
Part of the problem is their usage of the word “race,” which does not 
always mean what modern readers expect. The sorts of groups that move up the 
scale are not the same as the ones that branch off and diversify, but are more 
often subgroups—ones that we would tend to think of today as “ethnic groups.” 
Another part of the problem is the dearth of diagrams from Darwin and Wallace. 
And another is the abundance of diagrams from Haeckel, which are not always 
consistent with each other or with the accompanying texts. 
This essay analyzes the writings and (where available) the tree-diagrams 
of Darwin, Haeckel, and to a lesser extent Wallace, with the aim of clarifying and 
comparing their views on the origins of humans and their races. As we shall see, 
Wallace took the lead in developing a Darwinian answer to the monogenism-
polygenism question in 1864, and he compromised most with the polygenic view. 
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He argued that the races must have diverged at a distant, pre-human stage. 
Darwin opposed that interpretation and made racial divergence more recent and 
superficial. Haeckel was equivocal. On the whole, he accentuated racial 
divergence more strongly than Darwin, but, by my reading of his tree diagrams, 
he also allowed for more recent common ancestry of the races than did Wallace.3 
Although they speak of progress toward the human level and of ranks below it, all 
three are clearly committed to branching evolutionary trees of primates and of 
human races. 
 
Haeckel’s Phylogenetic Trees 
Historians and biologists alike have been reluctant to accept Haeckel as a proper 
Darwinian. There is the most doubt about Haeckel’s adherence to the branching 
tree of evolution that is considered a hallmark of the Darwinism. By most 
accounts, Haeckel bowdlerized Darwin’s theory because he was steeped in 
German Romantic Naturphilosophie and idealistic morphology and to the linear 
schemes of Lamarck. He clung to archaic notions of ideal types and scales of 
progress and perfection. Gould’s influential account depicted Haeckel’s bad 
Darwinism and outmoded morphology as sources of Nazi racial ideology4 and 
contributed to a long-running line of argument that has identified Haeckel and 
German Darwinism with Romantic and idealistic morphology and generally 
placed them outside of the international mainstream.5  
To the extent that they rely on the linearity of Haeckel’s evolutionary 
schemes, these accounts are very poorly supported. Aside from his general 
admiration for Goethe and Lamarck, little evidence is ever cited for a linear scale 
in Haeckel, other than the illustration in Figure 1, from Anthropogenie [The 
Evolution of Man] (Haeckel 1874, Fig. XII, facing 496). The impressive tree trunk 
rising toward the Menschen [Humans] at the top surely suggests a single main 
path of ascent, but just as surely, the tree does have branches. Not all paths lead 
upward and not all upward paths lead to humanity. Moreover, Haeckel repudiates 
the scale of nature, simplistic measures of progress and perfection 
[Vervollkommnung], and any suggestion of a teleological progression toward 
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Man. 
The persistence of linear scales and classification schemes in Romantic-
era and later German biology tends to be overstated. The “Great Chain of Being” 
might still have had a hold on Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck as late as 1809, but 
even his chain was beginning to branch by then (see Figure 2, from Lamarck 
1809). Romantic-era German morphologists were ambivalent about it, at best, 
and experimented with various geometries and measures of progress. If they 
applied the scale of nature at all, it was only with caveats, bends, backtracks, and 
sometimes some branching like Lamarck’s. 
The embryologist von Baer, whom Haeckel counted as an important 
forerunner of evolutionary thought, had treated linear developmental or 
evolutionary schemes scornfully in 1828, “Because a unilinear metamorphosis, 
like a railroad, only allows movement upward or downward, not to the side.”6  
 
Figure 1: Tree of human evolution from Haeckel’s Anthropogenie (1874) with 
distinct main trunk [digitized by Google (available from Hathi Trust)]. 
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Figure 2. Tree diagram from Lamarck’s Philosophie Zoologique (1809). Most 
animals descend from the worms, which are at the top left [digitized by Google 
(available from Hathi Trust).] 
 
Such a narrow and arbitrary pathway constrained nature’s creativity and 
could not do justice to the obvious diversity of life. The paleontologist Bronn, 
another of Haeckel’s major pre-Darwinian authorities, had dispensed with it by 
the 1840s (Gliboff 2008, 61–86). Why would Haeckel want to revive it in 1874? 
He would have been reaching way back to the eighteenth century or earlier, not 
to just his supposed Romantic roots. 
It is a mistake to focus on the Anthropogenie tree to the exclusion of a 
forest of countervailing evidence. Of course that book would feature a tree that 
highlighted the line to Man—that line, and no other, was the subject of the book. 
And, again, the side branches were not left out, just trimmed short. But most 
important, they were clearly side branches: the forms they represented were not 
depicted as stages in human evolution. Especially toward the crown, there is 
ADDITIONS.
463
TABLEAU
Servant à montrer Vorigine des differens
animaux.
'Vers.
Tnmsoires.
Polypes.
Radiaires.
Annelides.
Cirrhipèdes.
Mollusques.
Insectes.
Arachnides.
Crustacés.
Poissons.
Reptiles.
Oiseaux.
Monotrèmes.
M. Amphibies.
M. Cétacés.
M. Onguiculés.
M. Ongulés.
Cette série d'animaux commençant par deux
G
e
n
e
ra
te
d
 f
o
r 
g
u
e
s
t 
(I
n
d
ia
n
a
 U
n
iv
e
rs
it
y
) 
o
n
 2
0
1
4
-1
0
-2
9
 1
5
:2
3
 G
M
T
  
/ 
 h
tt
p
:/
/h
d
l.
h
a
n
d
le
.n
e
t/
2
0
2
7
/m
d
p
.3
9
0
1
5
0
5
9
7
4
8
5
0
2
P
u
b
li
c
 D
o
m
a
in
, 
G
o
o
g
le
-d
ig
it
iz
e
d
  
/ 
 h
tt
p
:/
/w
w
w
.h
a
th
it
ru
s
t.
o
rg
/a
c
c
e
s
s
_
u
s
e
#
p
d
-g
o
o
g
le
Konturen VI (2014) 
 
 
110 
extensive branching for the apes and gibbons, and even some unlabeled lines 
that could be the human races, radiating from a common ancestor close to the 
top.7  
In the context of Haeckel’s other works, the mighty trunk of the human tree 
is an anomaly. All of his other trees—and he drew us many—are as deliquescent 
as the one in Figure 3 (Haeckel 1868, Plate I). And even within Anthropogenie, 
more detailed diagrams display extensive branching, as in Figure 4, which 
situates humans on the mammalian family tree (Haeckel 1874, 493). 
Darwin and Divergence 
In Darwin’s case, too, there has been some question about the branching 
pattern of human evolution. To be sure, in 1859, in The Origin he had ascribed 
great importance to what he called his principle of “divergence of character,” 
which was what made branches appear on the tree of life. The idea was that to 
succeed in the struggle for life, butting heads with your competitors was not 
always the best strategy. There were advantages in avoiding competition, too, for 
example by switching to new food sources. Natural selection would then favor 
difference as well as competitive superiority, and in this connection, Darwin 
introduced the one and only illustration in The Origin, shown in Figure 5 (Darwin 
1859, facing 117). 
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Figure 3: Tree of animal evolution from Haeckel’s Natürliche Schöpfungs- 
Geschichte (1868). Humans would be somewhere in the tuft of vertebrates at the 
upper right [digitized by Kurt Stüber (http://www.biolib.de)]. 
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Figure 4: Tree diagram of mammalian evolution from Haeckel’s Anthropogenie 
(1874), showing detailed branching of lineages [digitized by Google (available 
from Hathi Trust)]. 
 
Figure 5: Tree diagram from Origin of Species (1859) [digitized version from The 
Complete Works of Darwin Online (http://darwin-online.org.uk/)]. 
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Thanks to the horizontal dimension, Darwinian evolution is not constrained to 
going up or down on a track, but is free to go in various directions, without any 
one of them having to be superior or even directly comparable to any other. 
But then in The Descent of Man, Darwin oddly seems to forget—at least in 
the early chapters—how important that horizontal dimension had been to him. He 
does not draw us any trees, neither does he enumerate the steps in human 
evolution very systematically, but his language does suggest a linear scale of 
mental and moral improvement. He describes various historical and living human 
subgroups as more or less “savage” or “civilized.” For example, he observes that, 
“The Fuegians rank amongst the lowest barbarians” (Darwin 1871, 1:34), and 
that, “Differences…between the highest men of the highest races and the lowest 
savages, are connected by the finest gradations” (Darwin 1871, 1:35). 
The implied scale goes from the Quadrumana (apes and monkeys) 
through the “early progenitors of man” (who have higher mental powers than 
apes, but cannot really use language [Darwin 1871, 1:56–57]), then “primeval 
men” (who used stone tools and spoke [Darwin 1871, 1:52]), “the lowest 
savages” (who could not count beyond four [Darwin 1871, 1:34]), various grades 
of barbarians and civilizations, and at last to modern Christendom. In short, 
chapters II–V would seem at first glance to line up the races in single file. 
In the secondary literature, these chapters are often taken to represent 
Darwin’s view of human racial evolution in its entirety,8 but there is much more to 
consider. In the later chapters, Darwin finally introduces the horizontal axis of 
human evolution that enables racial divergence without superiority or inferiority 
(Darwin 1871, esp. ch. 19). But in contrast to The Origin, divergence is caused 
here exclusively by sexual selection. 
Natural selection was unsuitable as the driver of human racial divergence, 
because it favored variations that were useful in the struggle for existence (even 
if not always in head-to-head competition). Darwin held that racial differences—at 
least the physical ones—could not be so useful: “As far as we are able to judge 
(although always liable to error on this head) not one of the external differences 
between the races of man are of any direct or special service to him….” 
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Considering physical appearance, at least, 
Man resembles those forms, called by naturalists protean or polymorphic, 
which have remained extremely variable, owing, as it seems, to their 
variations being of an indifferent nature, and consequently to their having 
escaped natural selection. (Darwin 1871, 1:248–249) 
Mental and behavioral differences were, however, a different matter: “The 
intellectual and moral or social faculties must of course be excepted from this 
remark” (Darwin 1871, 1:249). Changes in these kinds of traits were indeed 
subject to natural selection and moved the group up or down on the scale, not 
sideways, hence did not account for the branching off of the races. Conversely, 
the races branched off without the action of natural selection and without 
changing mentally and morally. Darwin has dissociated the physical divergence 
of the races from their mental and moral ascent. 
Darwin used sexual selection to explain racial divergence as follows: 
some ancestral populations in different geographic regions just happened to vary 
slightly, maybe because of some local environmental effect, or just by chance. 
No important characteristic varied, only something like skin color, hair texture, 
nose shape, or limb proportions. In each region, the natives admired their own 
peculiarities, considered them marks of beauty, and selected mates accordingly. 
In Africa, for example, the darker-skinned beauties had greater success at 
mating and reproduction; in Europe, the bright, pink ones were preferred. Over 
many generations these mating preferences perpetuated, accentuated, and 
spread the original regional characteristic. 
If one had not read about the scale of ascent at the beginning of The 
Descent, one might see in sexual selection the basis for a very egalitarian 
account of racial divergence. The horizontal dimension that it opens up makes 
room for a tree with the races side by side on different branches, with the 
differences being only matters of taste. 
In order to reconcile the two parts of the book, it is important to make a 
distinction between races and Races. The big ones—e.g., Negroid, Caucasoid, 
Mongoloid—diverged in Darwin’s account by sexual selection, and their 
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differences were physical, non-adaptive, and “sideways” on the scale of nature. 
At the point in time when they began to diverge, they were at the same level: 
they were human already, either “primeval men,” or maybe “savages.” Darwin 
had the big Racial classifications becoming established without reference to 
mental or moral superiority. 
In contrast, the “races” that rise up the scale in the earlier chapters are 
subgroups, more like modern “ethnic groups.” Darwin does not even refer to 
them consistently as races. When describing hypothetical pathways of struggle 
and ascent, Darwin is just as likely to pit “tribes” against one another (Darwin 
1871, 1:159–167). Or when discussing concrete examples such as the Irish and 
the Scots, Frenchmen, Esquimaux, Fuegians, Hottentots, or Tahitians, he tends 
to call them “nations” (Darwin 1871, 1:167–184). These subgroups ascend 
independently of the rest of their Races to a variety of heights, for a variety of 
reasons: “It is, however, very difficult to form any judgment why one particular 
tribe and not another has been successful and has risen in the scale of 
civilisation” (Darwin 1871, 1:166). On the whole, it seemed to be because of local 
circumstances and customs: 
Progress seems to depend on many concurrent favourable conditions, far 
too complex to be followed out. But it has often been remarked, that a cool 
climate from leading to industry and the various arts has been highly 
favourable, or even indispensable for this end. The Esquimaux, pressed 
by hard necessity, have succeeded in many ingenious inventions, but their 
climate has been too severe for continued progress. Nomadic habits, 
whether over wide plains, or through the dense forests of the tropics, or 
along the shores of the sea, have in every case been highly detrimental. 
Whilst observing the barbarous inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego, it struck 
me that the possession of some property, a fixed abode, and the union of 
many families under a chief, were the indispensable requisites for 
civilisation. 
Luck could also be a factor: 
Such habits almost necessitate the cultivation of the ground; and the first 
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steps in cultivation would probably result, as I have elsewhere shewn, 
from some such accident as the seeds of a fruit-tree falling on a heap of 
refuse and producing an unusually fine variety. (Darwin 1871, 1:167) 
In any case, Darwin nowhere suggested that tribes or nations ascended 
(or failed to do so) because of their color or anything else about their ancestral 
stock or Race. Subgroups of every Race could be found at many different levels. 
One could not assess a subgroup’s mental or moral level just by looking at them. 
Darwin provided no tree diagram of the races, but I would like to suggest 
that he approved of Haeckel’s picture in the Natürliche Schöpfungs-Geschichte 
of 1868, which Darwin praised effusively in The Descent. There, Haeckel 
arranged the races in a bushy tree, and placed subgroups of each of the great 
Races at various heights on the scale. 
 
Haeckel on Racial Diversification 
Two major differences between Darwin and Haeckel should be noted, however. 
First, even though Darwin sang Haeckel’s praises for appreciating the “full 
importance” of sexual selection (Darwin 1871, 1:4), one place where Haeckel did 
not invoke that form of selection was in his account of human racial divergence. 
He had the races diverging for other reasons, such as environmental effects, 
natural selection, and correlations that might allow insignificant characteristics to 
ride the coattails of more advantageous ones. This is consistent in all the editions 
of Natürliche Schöpfungs-Geschichte, even those that came out after Darwin’s 
Descent. So divergence, for Haeckel, did have survival value and could result in 
the superiority of one branch of the human tree over another. 
Second, Haeckel usually referred to the major Races as “species,” with 
subdivisions into subspecies and variants [Menschenarten, Unterarten, and 
Abarten]. Even though Haeckel noted that Darwin had rendered the distinction 
between species and races or varieties blurry and unimportant, his terminology 
accentuated the differences much more strongly than Darwin’s. This was one 
way in which Haeckel reached out to the polygenist anthropologists, who 
preferred the species-level classification. 
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These differences notwithstanding, I think Haeckel’s diagrams still capture 
the general pattern that Darwin had in mind. Consider Haeckel’s first attempt at a 
family tree of the human races, from the first edition of Natürliche Schöpfungs-
Geschichte, shown in Figure 6  (Haeckel 1868, Plate VIII ). It depicts a richly 
branching and diverse family, with the various groups rising to different levels of 
mental, social, or cultural attainment. The horizontal dimension is unmistakable. 
There is plenty of room to be different without being inferior. 
Although they overlap, the range of heights reached by the colored races 
is lower than the whiter ones, so the system does reflect conventional racial 
prejudices. But there are also some surprising equalities, especially near the top, 
where we find Berbers and Jews joining the Germans. 
The illustrations also capture some of the dynamism that I think Darwin, 
too, envisioned. There is considerable movement of racial groups between 
editions of the book. As Robert J. Richards has argued, these movements invite 
interpretation as illustrations of how Haeckel perceived human cultural and 
perhaps also biological progress during his own lifetime (Richards 2008, 244–
55). On that view, Haeckel’s racial classification system is only a snapshot of a 
living tree, on which the inferior groups are not stuck permanently at the lower 
levels, but have the potential for growing upward. 
So when Darwin says in 1871 (and later) that he agrees with Haeckel on 
human evolution (Darwin 1871, 1:4), that indeed he would not even have 
attempted to write The Descent if Haeckel’s Natürliche Schöpfungs-Geschichte 
had appeared any sooner, he must be satisfied with the way Haeckel captured 
the general pattern and the dialectical interactions of ascent and divergence—or 
at least he preferred to side with Haeckel rather than Wallace. 
 
Where the Races Branch Off 
In a paper presented to the Anthropological Society in 1864, Wallace had 
argued that once our ancestors reached the human level, the effects of natural 
selection on their bodies would have to be greatly diminished. Full-fledged 
humans would respond to environmental or competitive challenges by changing 
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their clothing, housing, tools, or social organization (Wallace 1864, esp. 162–
166). Most bodily variations would be immaterial for survival. 
 
Figure  6: Family  tree  of  the  human  races,  from  Haeckel’s  Natürliche 
Schöpfungs-Geschichte (1868) [digitized by Kurt Stüber (http://www.biolib.de)]. 
 
But if humans were no longer evolving much physically, how could they 
possibly differentiate into races? Wallace reasoned that racial differences must 
date from a much older period, when physical variation still was important. It was 
a time when Man was not fully human and  
had not yet acquired that wonderfully developed brain…, when he had the 
form but hardly the nature of man, when he neither possessed human 
speech, nor those sympathetic and moral feelings which in a greater or 
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less degree everywhere now distinguish the race.  
Ascent was still possible for the separate races, then as now, because natural 
selection always favored mental and moral characteristics such as: 
Capacity for acting in concert, for protection and for the acquisition of food 
and shelter; sympathy, which leads all in turn to assist each other; the 
sense of right, which checks depredations upon our fellows; the decrease 
of the combative and destructive propensities; self-restraint in present 
appetites. (Wallace 1864, 162) 
Our ape-level ancestors, then, must already have split up into races, and each 
race must have developed these mental and moral qualities, and become fully 
human, in its own way. 
Darwin disagreed. He wrote in The Descent, referring to Man as a 
species, that “since he attained to the rank of manhood, he has diverged into 
distinct races” and that the common ancestor of all the races “would probably 
have deserved to rank as man” (Darwin 1871, 2:388, emphasis added). 
Haeckel is more difficult to pin down on this point. Was the last common 
ancestor of all the races still a man-ape [Menschenaffe] or already an ape-man 
[Affenmensch]? Could it speak? That would be more or less decisive, because 
Haeckel counted the acquisition of language as a most important last step in 
becoming human. Or, if it could not speak, was it already differentiated into 
separate races that would each invent speech and become human 
independently? 
At least in his later works, Haeckel identified this last pre- or protohuman 
ancestor as the hypothetical Pithecanthropus alalus or “ape-man without speech” 
(Figure 7). After the discovery of Java Man, or Pithecanthropus erectus (now 
classified as Homo erectus erectus), was reported in 1894, Haeckel bragged that 
he had come very close to anticipating the real thing, the real missing link 
(Haeckel 1898, 715–716). 
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Figure 7: Artist’s conception of Pithecanthropus alalus, from Natürliche 
Schöpfungs-Geschichte (1898), Plate XIX, between 104 and 105. Based on an 
1894 painting by Gabriel Max [digitized by Google (available from Hathi Trust)]. 
 
But Haeckel was inconsistent in how he classified this last non-speaking 
ancestor. Sometimes he gave it the formal Linnaean binomial of the distinct 
genus and species Pithecanthropus alalus, sometimes he used only the generic 
Pithecanthropus, sometimes just Alalus as if it were itself a distinct genus, and 
sometimes he used only the vernacular Urmensch [primeval man] or 
Affenmensch [ape-man]. Thus he left himself some room for reinterpretation, 
while also suggesting a level that is human in most ways, just not in the use of 
language. 
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Let us look again at the tree diagrams to see if they offer further 
clarification. In 1868 (Figure 6), the base of the tree is labeled “Urmensch oder 
Affenmensch, entstanden aus Menschenaffen” [Primeval man or ape-man, 
originating from the anthropoid apes]. Clearly this is a notch above the 
anthropoid apes, but we are given the choice of whether to emphasize its 
humanity and call it an Urmensch or its intermediacy and call it an Affenmensch. 
Another diagram from the 1868 edition shows the transition from the apes 
in a little more detail (Figure 8, from Haeckel 1868, 493). Here, as we approach 
the top of the tree, that advanced, but still a-lingual stage is identified as 
“Sprachloser Mensch Alalus oder Affenmensch Pithecanthropus.” Again we are 
given a choice of terms, but the contrast is stronger than in the racial tree of 
Figure 6, since the first is no longer an Urmensch, but a Mensch, albeit still 
qualified as sprachlos [speechless]. The addition of zoological Latin names 
suggests a difference at the genus-level, with Alalus apparently higher than 
Pithecanthropus. 
In any case, in Haeckel’s depiction, the races do not branch out directly at 
this pre-human level, as Wallace would have had it. Instead, the line continues 
upward to the stage of the “Sprechender Mensch Homo,” which is clearly 
supposed to be human, since it speaks and is placed in the human genus. Only 
then, after establishing their common humanity and common membership in the 
genus Homo, do the two main racial groups—the wooly-haired and the straight-
haired—diverge. This is Haeckel’s most egalitarian picture of the human tree. 
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Figure 8: Family tree of apes and men, from Haeckel’s Natürliche Schöpfungs- 
Geschichte (1868) [digitized by Kurt Stüber (http://www.biolib.de)]. 
 
The diagram by itself would put Haeckel in close agreement with Darwin, 
but the accompanying text hews a bit more toward Wallace. Following the 
historical linguist August Schleicher, Haeckel argues there that the main human 
language groups were ultimately unrelated and did not have a common origin in 
a single Ursprache. Hence, if it could be assumed that racial evolution ran 
parallel to language evolution, that single “Sprechender Mensch Homo” stage at 
the base of the human part of the tree might not actually have existed. The 
transition to the speaking stage and to humanity would then have occurred 
several separate times, giving rise each time to a distinct race and language 
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family. 
Haeckel writes: 
Human speech as such probably developed only after the genus of 
speechless primeval men or ape-men split up into several species. In 
each of these human species, and maybe even in various subspecies and 
variants of these species, speech developed on its own and independently 
of the others.9  
On the other hand, Haeckel knew it was unsafe to rely on the linguistic evidence: 
As is well known, the boundaries of these language families correspond in 
no way with the boundaries of the various human species or so-called 
“races.” In this lies most eminently the great difficulty presented by the 
further pursuit of the human family tree into its individual branches, the 
species, races, variants, etc. 
The text leaves us with greater ambiguity than the diagram. It does not refer to 
any undifferentiated “Sprechender Mensch Homo” as the common ancestor of all 
the races. The races appear instead to have begun diverging at some quasi-
human stage, but Haeckel does not specify whether it is already the Urmensch or 
still the Affenmensch. 
In the 1870 edition (Figure 9, from Haeckel 1870, 571), Haeckel deepens 
the racial differences by deleting the “sprechender Mensch” stage from the 
diagram and having the races branch off directly from the “Sprachlose Menschen 
(Alali) oder Affenmenschen (Pithecanthropi).” The revision brings the diagram 
into better alignment with the (still ambiguous) text, where each of the nascent 
races acquires language on its own. There is no common Ursprache and 
perhaps no human-level common ancestor of the races, depending on how one 
prefers to classify that last unspeaking stage. Subsequent editions retain the 
same picture. 
Darwin, too, had been intrigued by the analogy between biological and 
linguistic evolution, but he argued firmly against relying on it as a guide to 
genealogy and classification, and he refrained more consistently than Haeckel 
from using it. Just because the linguists could find no trace of a primeval 
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common language, he warned, one should not jump to the conclusion that there 
really never was one: 
From the fundamental differences between certain languages, some 
philologists have inferred that when man first became widely diffused he 
was not a speaking animal; but it may be suspected that languages, far 
less perfect than any now spoken, aided by gestures, might have been 
used, and yet have left no traces on subsequent and more highly-
developed tongues. (Darwin 1871, 1:235) 
In Darwin’s view, those linguists had the sequence of evolutionary events 
all wrong. No lineage was likely to differentiate into races until it was successful 
enough to become dominant and “widely diffused” geographically. And in the 
case of humans, that kind of success could only come after the advent of 
language. This was not only because of the adaptive value of language—its 
utility for communication and social organization—but also because of the way 
language would stimulate further mental evolution: “Without the use of some 
language, however imperfect, it appears doubtful whether man’s intellect could 
have risen to the standard implied by his dominant position at an early period.”10 
In short, according to Darwin, language had to come first, before there were 
races. A unified species acquired speech, attained the human level, succeeded, 
multiplied, spread, and only then diversified into races. 
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Figure 9: Family tree of apes and men, from Haeckel’s Natürliche Schöpfungs-
Geschichte (1870) [digitized by Google (available from Google Books)]. 
 
Conclusion 
For a Darwinian evolutionist, then, the border region between animals and 
humans is a wide one, and it is traversed gradually by a family tree that allows for 
both ascent and divergence. This holds for Haeckel as much as for Darwin 
himself. Both rejected a linear scale of ascent. Both allowed for tribes, nations, or 
the smaller “racial” groupings to progress or regress independently and to reach 
a variety of levels within any major Race. 
As proponents of common descent, both had to reject polygenism in favor 
of monogenism, but they differed in how far back they would place the last 
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common ancestor of all the races and whether they would count it as already 
human. Haeckel was more willing than Darwin to reach out to the polygenists by 
making the linguistic and biological differences between the races into longer-
standing ones. Still, not even he fully endorsed Wallace’s compromise proposal. 
Especially in his family trees, Haeckel did not have the races diverging from one 
another until a point very close to (or perhaps even at) the fully human level. Of 
the three, only Wallace clearly gave the races an earlier pre-human origin and 
required each to find its own path upward. 
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1 For a recent overview and the case for a religious basis of American 
polygenism, see Keel 2013. 
2 This sort of compromise is discussed by Stocking 1968 and more recently by 
Alter 2007b, who calls it “evolutionary polygenism.” For more on nineteenth-
century conceptions of race, including polygenism and monogenism, see Stepan 
1982. On the centrality of racial issues in Charles Darwin’s intellectual 
development and his opposition to polygenism: Desmond and Moore 2011; 
Desmond and Moore 2004. 
3 On Darwin’s rejection of Wallace’s approach, see Alter 2007b; Desmond 
and Moore 2011, 341–347 & 366–368. Alter has Darwin reacting more to 
Haeckel than to Wallace, however, and he sees Haeckel leaning more 
consistently toward polygenism than I do. 
4 Gould 1977, 77–78. Gould was endorsing the Haeckel-to-Hitler thesis 
from Gasman 1971. 
5 Bowler 1983; Breidbach 2003; Russell 1916; For an extended critique, see 
Gliboff 2008, 20–24. 
6 “Weil eine einreihige Metamorphose wie eine Eisenbahn nur vorwärts oder 
rückwärts gehen lässt, nicht zur Seite,” Baer 1828, 201. 
7 For a more authoritative discussion of the proper biological interpretation of this 
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tree diagram, see Jenner, in prep., ch. 4. 
8 See, e.g., Stepan 1982, 52–66; Beasley 2010, 97–111. Even Desmond and 
Moore, who otherwise ascribe a rather egalitarian view of race to Darwin, 
concede that in The Descent he adopts a conventional linear scale on which to 
rank the races: Desmond and Moore 2011, 364-369. An exception is Alter, who 
recognizes that the racial hierarchy of the early chapters is not the whole story, 
and in Darwin’s view not the inevitable outcome of evolution: Alter 2007b. 
9 “Die menschliche Sprache als solche entwickelte sich wahrscheinlich erst, 
nachdem die Gattung des sprachlosen Urmenschen oder Affenmenschen in 
mehrere Arten oder Species auseinander gegangen war. Bei jeder von diesen 
Menschenarten, und vielleicht selbst bei verschiedenen Unterarten und Abarten 
dieser Species, entwickelte sich die Sprache selbstständig und unabhängig von 
einander [sic],” Haeckel 1868, 510. 
10 Darwin 1871, 1:235; Alter 2008. For a more thorough comparison of Haeckel’s 
and Darwin’s uses of linguistics, see Alter 2007a. 
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